Negative advertising and electoral rules: an empirical evaluation of the Brazilian case

Danilo P. Souza () and Marcos Y. Nakaguma ()

No 2018_10, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: This paper assesses how electoral institutions shape candidates’ incentives about their political advertising strategies. Taking advantage of a discontinuity in the assigment of brazilian municipal election rules, we use a RDD approach to assess how the candidates campaign tone is affected by a shift from a single-ballot to a runoff system. Using an unique database about litigations involving mayor candidates in the elections of 2012 and 2016, results show that 2nd and 3rd placed candidates in the first round of a runoff election have a probability more than 50 p.p. higher of being part in a litigation regarding negative advertising when compared to a single round election.

Keywords: elections; negative advertising; political advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C29 D72 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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