To Burn a Slum: Urban Land Conflicts and the Use of Arson against Favelas

Rafael Pucci ()

No 2024_13, Working Papers, Department of Economics from University of São Paulo (FEA-USP)

Abstract: This paper investigates the understudied phenomenon of urban land conflicts in contexts with weak enforcement of property rights. I examine, both theoretically and empirically, the use of arson as a violent tool to force slum removal from high-value land in cities. Leveraging fine-grained geocoded data, I employ panel regression and Difference-in-Differences analyses to demonstrate that the probability of slum fires dramatically increases with rising land prices. This effect is nonlinear and driven exclusively by slums situated on private lands, highlighting the role of high-powered incentives behind arson. These results illustrate how urban land conflicts can have different outcomes than their rural counterparts.

Keywords: Urban Land Conflict; Slums; Arson; Violence; Property Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 K42 O18 R10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-dev, nep-iue, nep-law and nep-ure
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