Subsidized Monopolists and Product Prices: The Case of Major League Baseball

Phil Miller ()

No 629, Working Papers from International Association of Sports Economists, North American Association of Sports Economists

Abstract: In this paper, I analyze the setting of ticket prices when teams receive subsidization from the public. I model teams as entertainment providers, where entertainment is generated by selling wins and amenities. I argue that subsidization of teams generally comes from subsidizing the amenities in and surrounding the teams’ stadiums. Subsidization of the amenities lowers the marginal cost of providing them to fans and should drive ticket prices lower. The empirical analysis suggests that this is the case.

Keywords: Sports; Baseball (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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