Generating Functions for Coalitional Power Indices: An Application to the IMF

J. Alonso-Meijide and C. Bowles ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2005, vol. 137, issue 1, 44 pages

Abstract: This paper provides “ready-to-apply” procedures, based on generating functions, which allow to compute power indices in weighted majority games restricted by an a priori system of unions. We illustrate these methods by an application to the International Monetary Fund. We compare the empirical properties of the coalitional and traditional power indices keeping the game fixed or allowing for variations in its set of parameters. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: simple game; coalitional value; generating function; IMF (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-005-2242-y

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