Supply chain network competition among blood service organizations: a Generalized Nash Equilibrium framework

Anna Nagurney () and Pritha Dutta
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Anna Nagurney: University of Massachusetts
Pritha Dutta: University of Massachusetts

Annals of Operations Research, 2019, vol. 275, issue 2, No 13, 586 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we present a Generalized Nash Equilibrium model of supply chain network competition among blood service organizations which compete not only for blood donors but also for business from hospitals and medical centers. The model incorporates not only link capacities and associated arc multipliers to capture perishability, but also bounds on the number of donors in regions as well as lower and upper bounds on the demands at the demand points in order to ensure needed amounts for surgeries, treatments, etc., while reducing wastage. The concept of a variational equilibrium is utilized to transform the problem into a variational inequality problem, and alternative formulations are given. A Lagrange analysis yields economic insights. The proposed algorithmic procedure is then applied to a series of numerical examples in order to illustrate the impacts of disruptions in the form of a reduction on the number of donors as well as that of decreases in capacities of critical links such as testing and processing on RBC prices, demands, net revenues of the blood service organizations, and their overall utilities.

Keywords: Game theory; Blood supply chains; Supply chain competition; Generalized Nash equilibrium; Variational inequalities; Healthcare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-018-3029-2

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