Is blockchain a cure for peer-to-peer lending?

Wangcheng Yan () and Wenjun Zhou ()
Additional contact information
Wangcheng Yan: Advanced Institute of Business, Tongji University
Wenjun Zhou: Department of Business Analytics and Statistics, The University of Tennessee Knoxville

Annals of Operations Research, 2023, vol. 321, issue 1, No 24, 693-716

Abstract: Abstract The blockchain, a decentralized ledger system, has been considered a revolutionary technology to transform businesses, including the financial markets. As peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is also known for decentralization in the sense that individuals borrow from and lend to each other directly, bypassing traditional banks, we explore the possibility and benefits of blockchains in P2P lending. We first provide an economic analysis of existing P2P lending problems, including herding and platform-borrower collusion, with and without the blockchain mechanism. We note that, compared with the existing markets, blockchain-backed P2P lending is highly effective in privacy preservation and borrower quality distinction. Since the role of intermediaries is eliminated in the blockchain world, the chance of platform-borrower collusion is also minimized. Moreover, we show that borrowers and lenders can expect additional surplus when the origination fee in traditional P2P lending is replaced with a smaller tokenization cost and when borrowers present a more accurate financial incentive in a smart contract. With the smart contract, borrowers are allowed to propose optimal interest rates based on their creditworthiness and capacity of repayment while detailed personal information is not required. Additionally, we demonstrate that small investors’ surplus can be further enhanced due to the elimination of herding.

Keywords: Permissioned blockchains; Smart contract; Economic model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-022-05108-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:321:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-022-05108-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-022-05108-1

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().