An evolutionary game theory approach for analyzing risk-based financing schemes
Maryam Johari () and
Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh ()
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Maryam Johari: Iran University of Science and Technology
Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh: Iran University of Science and Technology
Annals of Operations Research, 2024, vol. 336, issue 3, No 13, 1637-1660
Abstract:
Abstract To achieve a competitive advantage, corporations are growingly adopting strategies to effectively promote their market demand. Trade credit payment and pricing strategies provided by corporates can efficiently influence customers’ purchasing behavior. Although granting a trade credit strategy can increase corporations’ market share, such a strategy is a risk-based financing program for corporations. Therefore, corporates should choose whether to use trade credit financing in their long-term. This paper proposes an analytical model to investigate the evolutionary behaviors of retailers regarding pricing and trade credit strategies in the long term. In the study under investigation, retailers can use two financing strategies: risk-based trade credit and non-trade credit (i.e., pricing). This study provides both numerical and analytical findings. Our findings demonstrate that the risk-based trade credit strategy is the stationary financing solution for retailers in the long term. The result indicates that when customers are financially constrained, providing a trade credit scheme to customers is a successful marketing policy in both short-term and long-term frameworks.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; One-population game; Risk-based trade credit; Pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05308-3
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