The cooperative analysis of oligopoly TU markets with infinitely many firms

Zhe Yang ()
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Zhe Yang: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Annals of Operations Research, 2025, vol. 345, issue 1, No 17, 517-532

Abstract: Abstract Our paper develops the work of cooperative oligopoly TU markets. Inspired by Zhao (Int J Game Theory 28(1):25–34, 1999) and Zhao (Games Econ Behav 27(1):153–168, 1999), our paper investigates the TU stable profit allocations of cooperative oligopoly TU markets with countably many firms. We first show that the set of $$\alpha -$$ α - TU stable profit allocations coincides with the set of $$\beta -$$ β - TU stable profit allocations. Furthermore, under some regular conditions, we shall prove the existence theorem of $$\alpha -$$ α - TU stable profit allocations for oligopoly TU markets with countably many firms.

Keywords: Profit allocation; Cooperative oligopoly TU markets; Countably many firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-024-06392-9

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