Coordinating a supply chain with green innovation in a dynamic setting

Qiao Zhang, Jianxiong Zhang () and Wansheng Tang
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Qiao Zhang: Tianjin University
Jianxiong Zhang: Tianjin University
Wansheng Tang: Tianjin University

4OR, 2017, vol. 15, issue 2, No 2, 133-162

Abstract: Abstract This paper addresses the channel coordination problem in a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, in which the manufacturer controls green innovation and wholes price, while the retailer controls sales price. Pricing and green innovation strategies in integrated and decentralized channels are computed and compared, and a two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. A Nash bargaining model is further developed to distribute the extra-profit between channel members. A numerical example is conducted to explore the impacts of green effectiveness and operational inefficiency effect on optimal/equilibrium solutions and coordination. The main results show that the green innovation investment, energy efficiency level and channel profit of integrated channel are larger than those of decentralized one, but the relationship of sales prices under two channel structures depends on system parameters. Green effectiveness exerts a positive effect on optimal/equilibrium solutions. The coordinator’s coordination capability is improved by green effectiveness, but weakened by operational inefficiency effect.

Keywords: Green innovation; Energy efficiency level; Coordination; Two-part tariff; Differential game; 90B50; 91A23; 91A35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10288-016-0327-x

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