Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing

Yukun Cheng (), Xiaotie Deng () and Dominik Scheder ()
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Yukun Cheng: Suzhou Key Laboratory for Big Data and Information Service, Suzhou University of Science and Technology
Xiaotie Deng: Peking University
Dominik Scheder: Shanghai Jiaotong University

4OR, 2018, vol. 16, issue 3, No 1, 260 pages

Abstract: Abstract Market makers choose and design market rules to serve certain objectives, such as to maximize revenue from the sales in the case of a single seller and multiple buyers. Given such rules, market participants play against each other to maximize their utility function values on goods acquired, possibly by hiding or misrepresenting their information needed in the implementation of market rules. Today’s Internet economy has changed the information collection process and may make some of the assumptions of market rule implementation obsolete. Here we make a fresh review of works on this challenge on the Internet where new economic systems operate.

Keywords: Market equilibrium; Auction; Nash Equilibrium; Truthfulness; Incentive Ratio; Algorithmic Game Theory; 90B60; 91A10; 90C27; 97M40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10288-018-0385-3

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