EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Generation Supply Bidding in Perfectly Competitive Electricity Markets

George Gross and David Finlay
Additional contact information
George Gross: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
David Finlay: OOCL Transportation Co.

Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 2000, vol. 6, issue 1, No 6, 83-98

Abstract: Abstract This paper reports on the development of a comprehensive framework for the analysis and formulation of bids in competitive electricity markets. Competing entities submit offers of power and energy to meet the next day's load. We use the England and Wales Power Pool as the basis for the development of a very general competitive power pool (CPP) framework. The framework provides the basis for solving the CPP dispatcher problem and for specifying the optimal bidding strategies. The CPP dispatcher selects the winning bids for the right to serve load each period of the scheduling horizon. The dispatcher must commit sufficient generation to meet the forecasted load and reserve requirements throughout the scheduling horizon. All the unique constraints under which electrical generators operate including start-up and shut-down time restrictions, reserve requirements and unit output limits must be taken into account. We develop an analytical formulation of the problem faced by a bidder in the CPP by specifying a strategy that maximizes his profits. The optimal bidding strategy is solved analytically for the case of perfect competition. The study in this work takes into account the principal sources of uncertainty—the load forecast and the actions of the other competitors. The formulation and solution methodology effectively exploit a Lagrangian relaxation based approach. We have conducted a wide range of numerical studies; a sample of numerical results are presented to illustrate the robustness and superiority of the analytically developed bidding strategies.

Keywords: uniform price auction; competitive power pool; Lagrangian relaxation; unit commitment; generator optimal bidding policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1023/A:1009677326718 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:comaot:v:6:y:2000:i:1:d:10.1023_a:1009677326718

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10588

DOI: 10.1023/A:1009677326718

Access Statistics for this article

Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory is currently edited by Terrill Frantz and Kathleen Carley

More articles in Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:6:y:2000:i:1:d:10.1023_a:1009677326718