Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource

Marta Biancardi () and Lucia Maddalena ()
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Marta Biancardi: University of Foggia
Lucia Maddalena: University of Foggia

Decisions in Economics and Finance, 2018, vol. 41, issue 2, No 7, 219-237

Abstract: Abstract We study the exploitation of a common groundwater resource, first as a static and then as a differential game, in order to take into account the strategic and dynamic interactions among the users of the resource. We suppose that firms can form coalitions or can decide not to cooperate. The non-cooperation regime is characterized by pumping that lead to depletion of the aquifer; the cooperation preserves the resource. Open-loop and feedback equilibria have been computed and compared in order to characterize the existence of cooperators and defectors in water resources management.

Keywords: Groundwater extraction; Competition and cooperation; Differential game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D99 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10203-018-0217-0

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