Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly

Kenji Fujiwara () and Ngo Long

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2011, vol. 1, issue 4, 479-497

Keywords: Dynamic game; Exhaustible resource; Stackelberg leadership; Feedback equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly (2011)
Working Paper: Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market Under Bilateral Monopoly (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0036-1

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