Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games with Borel Measurable Payoffs

Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi ()

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2015, vol. 5, issue 1, 120-135

Abstract: An autonomous correlation device in a multistage game is a device that, before every stage, chooses for each player a private signal, possibly in a correlated way, and reveals to each player the signal chosen for him. The chosen signals depend only on previous signals, and not on the actions of the players. An extensive-form correlated $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in a multistage game is an $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in an extended game that includes an autonomous correlation device. In this paper we prove that every stochastic game with Borel measurable bounded payoffs has an extensive-form correlated $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium, for every $$\varepsilon >0$$ ε > 0 . Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Stochastic game; Extensive-form correlated equilibrium; Borel payoffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13235-014-0122-2 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:5:y:2015:i:1:p:120-135

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-014-0122-2

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().