An Effective Replicator Equation for Games with a Continuous Strategy Set

M. Ruijgrok () and Th. Ruijgrok ()

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2015, vol. 5, issue 2, 157-179

Abstract: The replicator equation for a two-person symmetric game, which has an interval of the real line as strategy space, is extended with a mutation term. Assuming that the distribution of the strategies has a continuous density, a partial differential equation for this density is derived. The equation is analysed for two examples. A connection is made with the canonical equation from adaptive dynamics and the continuous stable strategy criterion. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Evolutionary games; Replicator equation; Mutation; Dynamic stability; Partial differential equations; MSC 91A22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-014-0118-y

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