Public education and social security: a political economy approach

Tetsuo Ono

Economics of Governance, 2015, vol. 16, issue 1, 25 pages

Abstract: This study presents an overlapping-generations model with altruism towards children. We characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of voting over two policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the old. The model potentially generates two types of political equilibria, one favoring public education and the other favoring social security. One equilibrium is selected by the government to maximize its objective. It is shown that (i) longevity affects equilibrium selection and relevant policy choices; and (ii) private education as an alternative to public education and a Markov-perfect political equilibrium can generate the two types of equilibria. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Public education; Social security; Intergenerational conflict; H52; H55; I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach (2014)
Working Paper: Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach (2013)
Working Paper: Public Education and Social Security: A Political Economy Approach (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:16:y:2015:i:1:p:1-25

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-014-0149-2

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