Unawareness and indifference to economic reform among the public: evidence from India’s power sector reform
Chao-yo Cheng and
Johannes Urpelainen ()
Additional contact information
Chao-yo Cheng: University of California
Johannes Urpelainen: Columbia University
Economics of Governance, 2016, vol. 17, issue 3, No 1, 239 pages
Abstract:
Abstract Although economic reform generates winners and losers, many people have no opinion whatsoever about it. Because most empirical research ignores these non-responses, the conventional wisdom on the determinants of support for economic reform ignores large groups of silent citizens. To correct this problem, we present a stylized model that accounts for support, opposition, indifference, and unawareness about reform. We argue that informed people and those who perceive the status quo as dysfunctional will form an opinion more readily than others. For evidence, we examine public opinion about electricity privatization from a large field survey in rural India. We find that information and perceived inefficiency have much larger effects on the likelihood of forming an opinion than on the direction of that opinion (yes or no), emphasizing the importance of accounting for opinion formation process. In this case, information and perceived inefficiency make reform a salient issue to a passive public, most of whom become vocal opponents of reform.
Keywords: Economic reform; Public opinion; Privatization; Electricity and energy policy; India; Survey analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10101-015-0179-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:17:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s10101-015-0179-4
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/10101/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-015-0179-4
Access Statistics for this article
Economics of Governance is currently edited by Amihai Glazer and Marko Koethenbuerger
More articles in Economics of Governance from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().