A test of the institutionally-induced equilibrium hypothesis: on the limited fiscal impact of two celebrity governors

Roger Congleton and Yang Zhou ()
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Yang Zhou: West Virginia University

Economics of Governance, 2019, vol. 20, issue 2, No 1, 103-128

Abstract: Abstract The governorships of Jesse Ventura of Minnesota and Arnold Schwarzenegger of California provide two natural experiments for testing the institutionally induced stability hypothesis. Both men rose to their governorships through unique career and electoral paths that would reduce the stabilizing effects of partisan commitments and electoral competition, which would tend to increase their impact on public policy. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests that despite their unique backgrounds and paths to office neither governor had a statistically significant impact on their state’s expenditures or deficits.

Keywords: Government experience; Natural experiment; Outsidership; Governor; Fiscal policy; Minnesota; Jesse Ventura; California; Arnold Schwarzenegger; H71; H72; H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: A Test of the Institutionally Induced Equilibrium Hypothesis: On the Limited Fiscal Impact of Two Celebrity Governors (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-0218-z

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