The effects of dynamic incentives on the recycling of livestock and poultry manure in a multiscenario evolutionary game

L. X. Xiong (), X. Y. Li (), J. J. Ning (), Y. R. Dong () and Y. Yan ()
Additional contact information
L. X. Xiong: Central South University of Forestry and Technology
X. Y. Li: Central South University of Forestry and Technology
J. J. Ning: Central South University of Forestry and Technology
Y. R. Dong: Central South University of Forestry and Technology
Y. Yan: Central South University of Forestry and Technology

Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, 2023, vol. 25, issue 5, No 19, 4333 pages

Abstract: Abstract Accelerating the recycling of livestock and poultry manure is an important direction to control nonpoint-source pollution in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River. Based on evolutionary game theory, this study analyzes the complex behavioral interaction between farmers and breeding enterprises. We define the ideal scenarios and clarify the influence of key variables on the equilibrium results. The results show the following: (1) Replication dynamic analysis and an evolution phase diagram show that the optimal behavior strategy of farmers and breeding enterprises is organic fertilizer and recycling, and the evolutionary game between the parties tends toward the optimal solution. (2) When the government subsidy was $$\mu \hspace{0.17em}$$ μ = 0.55, farmers’ and breeding enterprises’ strategies tend to reach the optimal equilibrium the fastest after 3 weeks and 1 week, respectively; when government administrative efficiency was $$k\hspace{0.17em}$$ k = 5, farmers’ and breeding enterprises’ strategies tend to reach the optimal equilibrium the fastest after 10 weeks and 1 week, respectively. (3) Taking Anhua County of Hunan Province as an example, during the period of 2018–2020, the subsidy standard gradually increased from 25 to 45%, and the administrative efficiency increased by 63.3%. The enterprises involved in reconstruction to recycle waste increased by 218.9% and 132.2% in 2018–2019 and 2019–2020, respectively, which verifies the effectiveness of the evolutionary equilibrium results. The conclusions of this study can provide a reference for decision making regarding the fecal waste recycling of breeding enterprises and farmers.

Keywords: Multiscenario evolution; Dynamic incentive; Fecal waste recycling; Simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10668-022-02244-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:endesu:v:25:y:2023:i:5:d:10.1007_s10668-022-02244-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10668

DOI: 10.1007/s10668-022-02244-3

Access Statistics for this article

Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development is currently edited by Luc Hens

More articles in Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().