How do electoral competition and special interests shape the stringency of renewable energy standards?

Johannes Urpelainen ()

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2012, vol. 14, issue 1, 23-34

Keywords: Renewable energy; Special interests; Policy instruments; Game theory; Political economy; L50; Q54; Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10018-011-0020-4

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