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Unionized duopoly, market competition with differentiated products, and welfare

Domenico Buccella

Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, 2015, vol. 42, issue 4, 455-473

Abstract: Conventional wisdom associates high social welfare levels with more competitive product markets. Adopting a conjectural variation model in a unionized duopoly with differentiated products and right-to-manage bargaining, the present work finds that the impact of market competition on social welfare crucially depends on the degree of differentiation and the union’s disagreement utility. Copyright Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale 2015

Keywords: Bargaining; Conjectural variation; Unionized oligopoly; Social welfare; D43; J51; L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40812-015-0018-1

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Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics is currently edited by C. Cambini, M.G. Colombo, L. Piscitello, L. Rondi and A. Zanfei

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