The effect of information asymmetries on serial crowdfunding and campaign success

Vincenzo Butticè (), Carlotta Orsenigo () and Mike Wright
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Vincenzo Butticè: Economics and Industrial Engineering
Carlotta Orsenigo: Economics and Industrial Engineering

Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, 2018, vol. 45, issue 2, No 3, 143-173

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study how information asymmetries influence the relation between serial crowdfunding and campaign success. We argue that the main advantage of serial crowdfunders is related to the role of information asymmetry reduction of the community they had developed through previous campaigns. Therefore, serial crowdfunders experience higher advantages compared to novice crowdfunders for campaigns characterized by high information asymmetries while their advantages tend to disappear for other campaigns. Similarly, we show that when information asymmetries are particularly high, the advantages of serial crowdfunders are endurable over time, while when information asymmetries are lower they tend to disappear rapidly. Econometric results on a sample of 34217 Kickstarter projects confirm our contentions. These finding are confirmed when using machine learning techniques instead of classical econometric analysis. Implications for research, practice and policy are discussed.

Keywords: Crowdfunding; Serial crowdfunding; Information asymmetries; Online community; Success (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40812-017-0074-9

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