On the existence of essential and trembling-hand perfect equilibria in discontinuous games

Vincenzo Scalzo ()
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Vincenzo Scalzo: University of Napoli Federico II

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2014, vol. 2, issue 1, No 1, 12 pages

Abstract: Abstract We identify classes of discontinuous games with infinitely many pure strategies where, for every class and every game in a dense subset, any mixed-strategy equilibrium is essential. Moreover, in some cases, we prove that the essential mixed-strategy equilibria are trembling-hand perfect and each stable set of equilibria contains only one element.

Keywords: Discontinuous infinite games; Essential equilibria; Trembling-hand perfect equilibria; Strategic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-013-0021-5

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