Axiomatization of the discrete Raiffa solution

Walter Trockel ()
Additional contact information
Walter Trockel: Istanbul Bilgi University

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, vol. 3, issue 1, No 2, 9-17

Abstract: Abstract This article provides an axiomatic characterization of the discrete Raiffa solution for two-person bargaining games. The extension to $$n>2$$ n > 2 players is straightforward. This solution had been introduced as one of four “arbitration schemes” by Raiffa (Arbitration schemes for generalized-two person games, 1951; Ann Math Stud 28:361–387, 1953). The axiomatization expresses a consistency property by which the standard midpoint solution for TU-bargaining games can be extended to general NTU-bargaining games. The underlying linear approximation from inside captures a dual view to the linear approximation from outside that underlies Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) axiomatization of his Nash solution that is also embodied in Shapley’s (Utility comparison and the theory of games. In La Décision, pp. 251–263, 1969) $$\lambda $$ λ —transfer principle and, even earlier, in a lemma by Harsanyi (Contributions to the theory of games IV, pp 325–355, 1959). Finally, the present axiomatization is compared with other ones in the literature that are motivated by Kalai (Econometrica 45:1623–1630, 1977) axiom of step-by-step negotiation.

Keywords: Bargaining games; Raiffa solution; Nash solution; Axiomatization; 91A05; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-014-0046-4 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0046-4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40505

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0046-4

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory Bulletin is currently edited by Nicholas C. Yannelis

More articles in Economic Theory Bulletin from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().