Proximate preferences and almost full revelation in the Crawford–Sobel game

Murali Agastya, Parimal Kanti Bag () and Indranil Chakraborty ()
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Parimal Kanti Bag: National University of Singapore
Indranil Chakraborty: National University of Singapore

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, vol. 3, issue 2, No 6, 212 pages

Abstract: Abstract Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50(6):1431–1451, 1982) is a seminal contribution that introduced the study of costless signalling of privately held information by an expert to a decision maker. Among the chief reasons for its widespread application is the comparative statics they develop between the extent of strategically transmitted information and the degree of conflict in the two players’ preferences. This paper completes their analysis by establishing that in their general model, almost full revelation obtains as the two players’ preferences get arbitrarily close to each other.

Keywords: Cheap talk; Strategic information transmission; Bias; Convergence; Full revelation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0042-8

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