Equilibrium in discontinuous games without complete or transitive preferences

Philip Reny ()

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2016, vol. 4, issue 1, No 1, 4 pages

Abstract: Abstract Reny (Econ Theory, 2015) is used here to prove the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games in which the players’ preferences need be neither complete nor transitive. The proof adapts important ideas from Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2:345–348, 1975).

Keywords: Abstract games; Discontinuous games; Incomplete preferences; Nontransitive preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-015-0087-3

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