Equilibrium existence in group contests

Philip Brookins and Dmitry Ryvkin

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2016, vol. 4, issue 2, No 10, 265-276

Abstract: Abstract We prove the existence of pure strategy Bayesian equilibria in group contests under individual-level and group-level private information. For the latter type, we develop a novel approach reducing group contests to contests between individuals with multi-dimensional types, with far-reaching implications for the existence of equilibrium in various group contest settings, including the case of complete information.

Keywords: Group contest; Incomplete information; Equilibrium existence; Reduction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-015-0085-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium existence in group contests (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:etbull:v:4:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-015-0085-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40505

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-015-0085-5

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory Bulletin is currently edited by Nicholas C. Yannelis

More articles in Economic Theory Bulletin from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().