Disclosure of endogenous information

Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica ()
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Matthew Gentzkow: Stanford University
Emir Kamenica: University of Chicago

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2017, vol. 5, issue 1, No 5, 47-56

Abstract: Abstract We study the effect of disclosure requirements in environments where experts publicly acquire private information before engaging in a persuasion game with a decision maker. In contrast to settings where private information is exogenous, we show that disclosure requirements never change the set of equilibrium outcomes regardless of the players’ preferences.

Keywords: Persuasion; Disclosure regulation; Verifiable types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0099-7

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