Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?

Philippe Gillen (), Vitali Gretschko and Alexander Rasch
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Philippe Gillen: Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Economic Theory Bulletin, 2017, vol. 5, issue 2, No 2, 139-150

Abstract: Abstract We compare auctions with bidder qualification before or after the bidding process. We show that although post-auction qualification is more efficient, the auctioneer prefers pre-auction qualification when bidders’ qualification costs are high.

Keywords: Bidding cost; Qualification; Second-price sealed-bid auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0108-x

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