Cost allocation under competition: a new rail access charging policy

Martin Savelsbergh and Masoud Talebian ()
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Martin Savelsbergh: Georgia Institute of Technology
Masoud Talebian: Sharif University of Technology

EURO Journal on Transportation and Logistics, 2019, vol. 8, issue 5, No 3, 534 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider a setting in which a rail infrastructure provider divides the track costs proportionally between the above-rail operators based on their usage. We study a proposed access charge regime aimed at incentivizing the operators to use longer train configurations. The regime sets a target length and gives a discount on an operator’s charge if it deploys a configuration of at least the target. That is, the operators may be able to reduce their access charges by deploying a longer train configuration. We analyze the policy, and conditions under which both operators have an incentive to deploy long train configurations.

Keywords: Non-cooperative game theory; Freight transport; Infrastructure pricing; Train path; Transport policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s13676-018-0133-z

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