Environment-driven migration enhances cooperation in evolutionary public goods games

Shilin Xiao, Liming Zhang (), Haihong Li, Qionglin Dai () and Junzhong Yang
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Shilin Xiao: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Liming Zhang: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Haihong Li: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Qionglin Dai: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Junzhong Yang: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, 2022, vol. 95, issue 4, 1-9

Abstract: Abstract Migration plays a critical role in the evolution of cooperation under the framework of evolutionary game theory. Previous studies have demonstrated that individuals might make their migration decisions based on various information, for example, their current cooperative environments, potential advantages of new places, and their own aspirations. In reality, people may perceive environment information and make decisions based on these information. In this paper, we introduce an environment-driven migration into evolutionary public goods games which are carried out on a two-dimensional plane, where individuals decide whether to migrate according to the probabilities determined by the differences between the local and global cooperative environments. We find that such an environment-driven migration can effectively enhance cooperation. Furthermore, there exists an optimal migration noise that leads to a highest cooperation level. In addition, we also find that appropriate moving speeds and migration tendencies, as well as relatively low population densities in the model are more favorable to the evolution of cooperation. Graphic Abstract

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1140/epjb/s10051-022-00327-8

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