Negotiating Complex Contracts

Mark Klein (), Peyman Faratin (), Hiroki Sayama () and Yaneer Bar-Yam ()
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Mark Klein: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Peyman Faratin: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Hiroki Sayama: New England Complex Systems Institute
Yaneer Bar-Yam: New England Complex Systems Institute

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2003, vol. 12, issue 2, No 3, 125 pages

Abstract: Abstract Work to date on computational models of negotiation has focused almost exclusively on defining contracts consisting of one or a few independent issues and tractable contract spaces. Many real-world contracts, by contrast, are much more complex, consisting of multiple inter-dependent issues and intractably large contract spaces. This paper describes a simulated annealing based approach appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts that achieves near-optimal social welfares for negotiations with binary issue dependencies.

Keywords: interdependent issues; non-linear negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1023068821218

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