Negotiation over Costs and Benefits in Brownfield Redevelopment
Lizhong Wang,
Liping Fang () and
Keith W. Hipel
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Lizhong Wang: New Jersey Institute of Technology
Liping Fang: Ryerson University
Keith W. Hipel: University of Waterloo
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2011, vol. 20, issue 4, No 8, 509-524
Abstract:
Abstract A quantitative methodology is developed to support negotiations over the allocation of costs and benefits in brownfield redevelopment projects by utilizing cooperative game theory. In particular, guidelines for estimating the net benefits of various coalitions that can be formed by the landowners, developers and governments are presented. A general n-player cooperative game is formulated to model the negotiations. Two simple conditions are obtained for checking whether or not a three-player brownfield redevelopment negotiation game has a nonempty core. Various nucleolus concepts and the Shapley value are utilized to find alternative fair cost and benefit allocation schemes, from which the decision makers can negotiate. An illustrative example is employed to demonstrate how the proposed approach can be applied in practice.
Keywords: Negotiation; Cost/benefit allocation; Brownfield; Redevelopment; Cooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:20:y:2011:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-009-9179-5
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-009-9179-5
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