The Use of Ranking Veto Concept to Mitigate the Compensatory Effects of Additive Aggregation in Group Decisions on a Water Utility Automation Investment

Suzana de Suzana Dantas Daher () and Adiel Teixeira Almeida ()
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Suzana de Suzana Dantas Daher: Federal University of Pernambuco
Adiel Teixeira Almeida: Federal University of Pernambuco

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2012, vol. 21, issue 2, No 4, 185-204

Abstract: Abstract The use of additive models for aggregating group decisions implies they have a compensatory effect in the process of aggregating all decision makers’ (DMs’) preferences. In this kind of model, the final result may produce some extremely undesirable alternatives for one or more DMs. Such alternatives may emerge with a higher ranking than desirable ones, thus generating conflicts and regrets. To overcome this problem the concept of ranking veto is introduced based on a reduction factor combined with the utility of the alternative in order to penalize conflicting alternatives and reduce disagreements in an additive model. A water utility problem was considered as a numerical application to illustrate the model. A decision group method based on MAUT, utility thresholds and a reduction factor is proposed to support group decision in selecting regions that will receive investments in automation over the next 4 years.

Keywords: Group decision; MAUT; Ranking veto concept; Utility threshold; Investment in water utilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-011-9266-2

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