Fair Division Approach for the European Union’s Structural Policy Budget Allocation: An Application Study

Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska ()
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Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska: Poznań University of Life Sciences

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2014, vol. 23, issue 3, No 13, 597-615

Abstract: Abstract Fairness of resource allocation remains one of the basic criteria of public choice. Taking fairness into account in public resource allocation is critically important when decision-making creates conflicts of interest among potential stakeholders. The European Union’s structural policy budget allocation is especially prone to such conflicts, mainly due to its complexity and lack of commonly accepted indexes to measure its effects. The objective of this paper is to evaluate if a fair-division algorithm can be effectively implemented in practice to diminish conflicts and provide a fair allocation of resources. The practical application involves a problem of the EU’s rural-development policy budget in Poland. The algorithm provides a simple formal framework for budget allocation and utilizes structural program evaluation questionnaires of the key stakeholder groups. The provided example demonstrates that the implementation of a fair division algorithm is feasible in practice. The algorithm is flexible, robust to variation in pre-set budget constraints, and results in a sensible solution that achieves consensus among the stakeholder groups.

Keywords: Fair-division; Decision-making; EU structural policy; Budget allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-013-9346-6

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