Negotiation Based on Fuzzy Logic and Knowledge Engineering: Some Case Studies
Erick González (),
Rafael Alejandro Espín () and
Eduardo Fernández ()
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Erick González: Higher Technical Institute “José Antonio Echeverría”
Rafael Alejandro Espín: University of Occident
Eduardo Fernández: Autonomous University of Sinaloa
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2016, vol. 25, issue 2, No 7, 373-397
Abstract:
Abstract One of the most recent mathematical models for negotiation is the Compensatory Negotiation Solution by Knowledge Engineering (CNSKE). In this model a logic system called Compensatory Fuzzy Logic was used, which is more adequate to solve problems of decision making than the classical one probabilistic fuzzy logic system. The idempotency axiom of this system and the continuity of the operators allow the truth-values of the membership function to have a cardinal and not exclusively ordinal semantic meaning. On the other hand, continuity also makes ‘sensible’ the truth-values of the predicates. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the advantages of the CNSKE over other approaches in Game Theory. To show these advantages, some case studies are analyzed, consisting on the solution of three problems in which CNSKE is applied in economic and politic cases of negotiation, and compared with other alternative approaches.
Keywords: Negotiation; Game theory; Fuzzy logic; 91A12; 03B52; 68T50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-015-9446-6
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