Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?

Eyal Baharad () and Leif Danziger ()
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Eyal Baharad: Bar-Ilan University
Leif Danziger: Ben-Gurion University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2018, vol. 27, issue 1, No 7, 129-151

Abstract: Abstract We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the “almost” rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.

Keywords: Committee decisions; Scoring rules; “Almost” voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-017-9553-7

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