Project Staff Scheduling with Theory of Coalition

Oğuzhan Ahmet Arık (), Erkan Köse and Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest
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Oğuzhan Ahmet Arık: Nuh Naci Yazgan University
Erkan Köse: Nuh Naci Yazgan University
Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest: Slippery Rock University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2019, vol. 28, issue 4, No 7, 827-847

Abstract: Abstract Project scheduling has been still one of the hottest topics in the management area. The goal of traditional project management is to complete the project at the earliest possible time in accordance with the available resources without violating priority relations of the activities involved. Unlike traditional project management, this study deals with the possibility of a coalition among the staff available to accomplish tasks of the project. The tasks can be fulfilled by more than one staff members. Staff’s coalition shortens the completion time of the tasks. A natural problem that arises in this case is how to share the income generated. The other side of the problem is concerned with the project owner who wants the project to be completed as early as possible. In this study, a mathematical model proposal is dealt with in order to realize the goals of both the project owner and the staffs as much as possible within the complex structure of the situation.

Keywords: Shapley value; Coalition formation; Project scheduling; Staff allocation; 90Bxx; 91A80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-019-09617-6

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