A Rule for Committee Selection with Soft Diversity Constraints

Haris Aziz ()
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Haris Aziz: UNSW Sydney

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2019, vol. 28, issue 6, No 8, 1193-1200

Abstract: Abstract Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiquitous problem. However, many of the formal approaches proposed so far have certain drawbacks including (1) computational intractability in general, and (2) inability to suggest a solution for instances where the hard constraints cannot be met. We propose a cubic-time algorithm for diverse committee selection that satisfies natural axioms and draws on the idea of using soft bounds.

Keywords: Social choice theory; Committee voting; Multi-winner voting; Diversity constraints; Computational complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D61 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-019-09634-5

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