Does Paying Back Pay Off? Effects of Reciprocity and Economic Outcomes on Trust Emergence in Negotiations

Dominik Sondern () and Guido Hertel ()
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Dominik Sondern: University of Münster
Guido Hertel: University of Münster

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2019, vol. 28, issue 6, No 2, 1053-1076

Abstract: Abstract In two studies (n1 = 359; n2 = 455), we investigated the effects of reciprocal counterpart behavior and economic negotiation outcomes on interpersonal trust in dyadic negotiations. Moreover, counterparts’ power was considered as moderating factor. Using an experimental vignette approach, participants in both studies read a negotiation scenario, and were asked to imagine having conducted this negotiation. As part of the scenarios, we manipulated (a) counterpart’s bargaining power (high–low; only Study 1), (b) positive (high–low) and (c) negative reciprocal counterpart behavior (escalating–high–low), and (d) the economic negotiation outcome for the actor (advantageous–equal–disadvantageous; only Study 2). Results show that participants reported higher trust in the counterpart after positive reciprocal counterpart behavior, whereas escalating negative reciprocal counterpart behavior and disadvantageous economic outcomes reduced trust. However, the negative effect of escalating counterpart behavior was rather low when counterpart power was high. Implications of these results are relevant for sustainable trust development and long-term business relationships.

Keywords: Negotiation; Trust emergence; Reciprocity; Economic outcomes; Experimental vignettes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-019-09639-0

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