Aggregation of Correlated Judgments on Multiple Interconnected Issues

Takuya Sekiguchi () and Hisashi Ohtsuki ()
Additional contact information
Takuya Sekiguchi: RIKEN
Hisashi Ohtsuki: SOKENDAI (The Graduate University for Advanced Studies)

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2023, vol. 32, issue 1, No 9, 233-256

Abstract: Abstract This paper theoretically studies the outcome of the dependency among votes. In particular, we pay attention to the event that aggregation of logically consistent judgments by a large number of voters leads to a logically inconsistent collective judgment, i.e., discursive dilemma. In contrast to results found in the literature, which assumes independent voting, we find that if the dependence among votes exists, enhancing voters’ competences does not always entail a decrease in the probability of collective inconsistency. More precisely, a non-monotonic relation can arise between individual competences and the likelihood of collective inconsistency. Moreover, even a paradoxical monotonic relation can arise, in which the likelihood of the collective inconsistency increases as voters’ competences increase. We also examine the probability of collective inconsistency when a voter’s competence is variable. The result is qualitatively similar to that obtained from the model assuming constant competences. We conclude that allowing for dependencies between votes can give rise to a new problem about the difficulty of achieving collective consistency in collective decision-making on logically interconnected issues.

Keywords: Judgment aggregation; Discursive dilemma; Condorcet jury theorem; Dependent votes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-022-09806-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:32:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-022-09806-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10726/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-022-09806-w

Access Statistics for this article

Group Decision and Negotiation is currently edited by Gregory E. Kersten

More articles in Group Decision and Negotiation from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().