Values for Restricted Games with Externalities

M. Josune Albizuri, Satoshi Masuya and José M. Zarzuelo ()
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M. Josune Albizuri: Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea (UPV/EHU)
Satoshi Masuya: Daito Bunka University
José M. Zarzuelo: Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea (UPV/EHU)

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2024, vol. 33, issue 2, No 5, 369 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study cooperative games in which some of the coalitions are not viable and in addition, there are externalities among the feasible coalitions. These games are called here restricted partition function form games. For this class of games, two extensions of the Shapley value are proposed and characterized.

Keywords: Restricted games; Games with externalities; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-023-09864-8

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