Power Indices When Players can Commit to Reject Coalitions

László Kóczy ()

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2016, vol. 33, issue 1, No 11, 77-91

Abstract: Abstract Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory, known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the players’ random behaviour. We introduce a model where players can reject certain partnerships in cooperation. For normalised power indices strategic rejection may increase power. Our notion of a strategic power index is well defined if power is measured by an index that takes only minimal winning coalitions into account.

Keywords: Quarrelling; Rejected coalitions; A priori voting power; Power indices; Minimal winning coalitions; Rational players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions (2014)
Working Paper: Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-016-0002-7

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