A Well-Behaved Index of a Priori P-Power for Simple N-Person Games
Dan S. Felsenthal (msdanfl@mail.huji.ac.il)
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2016, vol. 33, issue 4, No 9, 367-381
Abstract:
Abstract As far as we know, all previously suggested indices of a priori P-power for simple n-person games violate one or more postulates that are considered compelling for a reasonable P-power index. A new index is proposed in this paper which satisfies all these postulates.
Keywords: Indices of voting power; N-person simple games; I-power; P-power; Postulates for a reasonable P-power index; Winning coalitions of least size; C71; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-016-0031-2
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