Environmental-agreement design and political ideology in democracies

Tobias Böhmelt ()
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Tobias Böhmelt: University of Essex

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2022, vol. 22, issue 3, No 4, 507-525

Abstract: Abstract Does the political ideology of negotiating parties influence the design of international environmental agreements? This article distinguishes between leftist and rightist executives in democracies to develop a twofold argument. First, left-leaning democratic governments tend to be generally more environmental-friendly, which implies that they should favor designs that are more conducive to effective institutions. Second, leftist democratic executives are commonly less concerned about sovereignty costs. Both mechanisms suggest that environmental treaties likely comprise “legalized,” i.e., hard-law elements when left-wing democracies negotiate their design. The empirical implication of the theory is tested with quantitative data on international environmental agreements since 1975. The findings report an association between leftist ideology in democracies and agreement legalization, although this is driven by aspects of sovereignty delegation. This article contributes to the literatures on environmental institutions, international cooperation more generally, as well as party politics.

Keywords: International environmental agreements; Design; Legalization; Political ideology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10784-022-09562-x

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