On Sugden’s “mutually beneficial practice” and Berge equilibrium
Bertrand Crettez ()
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Bertrand Crettez: Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II
International Review of Economics, 2017, vol. 64, issue 4, No 4, 357-366
Abstract:
Abstract Cooperative behavior is often observed in ordinary market transactions. To account for this observation, Robert Sugden proposes a team reasoning theory in which the common interest of team reasoners is defined by the notion of mutually beneficial practice. We study the relationships between mutually beneficial practices and Berge equilibria (a Berge equilibrium is a strategy profile such that a unilateral change of strategy by any one player cannot increase another player’s payoff). We propose two sufficient conditions under which a (strict) Berge equilibrium is a mutually beneficial practice.
Keywords: Berge equilibrium; Berge–Vaisman equilibrium; Mutually beneficial practice; Strict Berge equilibrium; Team reasoning; Sufficient condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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DOI: 10.1007/s12232-017-0278-3
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