Designing a European restructuring mechanism without taxpayers’ money

Armin Steinbach and Rainer Stollhoff

Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, 2013, vol. 48, issue 3, 167-173

Abstract: The European Commission’s approach to the supervision and restructuring of the EU banking system has numerous shortcomings. As an alternative, this article proposes a European Resolution Authority and a European Restructuring Fund for systemically important banks and the implementation of a levy paid by banks in accordance with their systemic relevance. This levy should be designed to reduce the risk of future bailouts and the moral hazard inherent in implicit government guarantees. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s10272-013-0458-7

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