Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners

Liwei Zhong and Yanqin Bai ()
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Liwei Zhong: Shanghai University
Yanqin Bai: Shanghai University

Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2019, vol. 37, issue 1, No 15, 286-292

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, three-sided stable matching problem is discussed, in which two sets, $$V_1$$ V 1 and $$V_2$$ V 2 are cooperative partners, and the agent of the other set U has a strict preference to the agents of set $$V_1$$ V 1 and set $$V_2$$ V 2 respectively. On the other side, the agents of set $$V_1$$ V 1 and set $$V_2$$ V 2 have a strict preference to the agent of set U . About this three-sided matching problem, this paper gives the definition of stable matching, proves that the problem must have a stable matching, and gives an algorithm that can obtain a stable matching.

Keywords: Three-sided matching; Stable matching; Algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10878-017-0224-z

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