Liquidity shocks and interbank market failures: the role of deposit flights, non-performing loans, and competition

Demian Macedo () and Victor Troster
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Demian Macedo: Universitat de les Illes Balears

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2021, vol. 16, issue 4, No 1, 705-746

Abstract: Abstract Banks may be reluctant to remove bad loans from their portfolios during liquidity shortfalls, giving rise to a moral hazard problem. In this paper, we analyze how liquidity shortages affect the ability of the interbank market to provide liquidity in a moral hazard setting. We distinguish two types of liquidity shocks that arise due to a deposit flight (a contraction in the deposit supply) or to a cash-flow shock (an increase in the non-performing loans). We show that the source of a liquidity shortfall is the main determinant of the decision of banks to stop lending in the interbank market, rather than the extra amount of funds that banks need to cover. An increase in the non-performing loans has more adverse effects on balance sheets than a deposit flight. We also demonstrate that competition has a dual effect on financial stability. Interbank competition enhances financial stability by reducing the liquidity provision cost, whereas credit market competition worsens financial stability by inducing banks to take riskier profiles.

Keywords: Liquidity shocks; Interbank market; Deposit flights; Non-performing loans; Credit market competition; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G00 G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-021-00326-5

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