Communication, choice continuity, and player number in a continuous-time public goods experiment

Yoshio Iida ()
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Yoshio Iida: Kyoto Sangyo University

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2021, vol. 16, issue 4, No 7, 955-988

Abstract: Abstract This study seeks to determine the fundamental factors that foster cooperative outcomes in continuous-time public goods (PG) experiments. Recent research reveals that the subjects in a continuous-time PG experiment with communication and in a continuous-time prisoner’s dilemma (PD) experiment exhibit highly cooperative behavior. This study more closely examines the role of communication in continuous-time PG experiments. Based on the results of a fixed-form communication experiment that yielded the same high contribution rate as a free communication experiment, this study shows that the essential elements of communication leading to cooperation are the call to cooperation and response to it. Additionally, this study investigates why continuous-time PD experiments can induce high-level mutual cooperation without communication—unlike a PG experiment—by conducting cross-experiments between them. The results reveal that the number of players is a highly important, and choice continuity of the PG experiment is not a significant obstacle.

Keywords: Public goods; Continuous-time game; Prisoner’s dilemma; Communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11403-021-00334-5

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